Abstract The rapid spread of residential broadband connections and Internet-capable consumer devices in home networks has changed the landscape of Internet traffic. To gain a deep understanding of Internet traffic for home networks, this paper develops a traffic monitoring platform that collects and analyzes home network traffic via programmable home routers and traffic profiling servers. Using traffic data captured from real home networks, we present traffic characteristics in home networks and then apply principal component analysis to uncover temporal correlations among application ports. In light of prevalent unwanted traffic on the Internet, we characterize the intensity, sources, and port diversity of unwanted traffic toward home networks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study to characterize network traffic of Internet-capable devices from inside home network.
Introduction
In recent years, the rapid growth of Internet-capable devices in the home and residential broadband access has driven the rising adoptions of home networks. The availability of home networks not only creates new application opportunities such as remote health care and Internet television, but also changes the distribution of Internet traffic, e.g., a recent study shows that video streaming via Netflix accounts for 32.7 % of peak downstream traffic in United States [1] . As home networks become an important part of the Internet ecosystem, it is very crucial to understand network traffic between the Internet and home networks as well as the traffic exchanged within home devices.
Most home users lack technical expertise to manage the increasingly complicated home networks, and an extensive body of research has focused on how to simplify network management tasks for home users [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Several recent studies have been devoted to understanding traffic characteristics of home networks using aggregated and sampled traffic collected from edge routers in Internet service providers [7] [8] [9] . However, these measurement studies stand from the perspective of outside home networks and thus lack the visibility of what is happening in home networks. The in-depth understanding of home network traffic could aid home users in effectively securing and managing home networks.
In this paper, we focus on understanding traffic characteristics in home networks. Toward this end, we first develop a traffic monitoring platform that collects network flow streams via traffic profiling servers and programmable home routers that connect home networks and the Internet via home gateways such as DSL or cable modems. Using traffic data collected from real home networks, we analyze traffic patterns of connected devices in home networks and characterize the volume, behavior, and temporal features of home network traffic.
Our findings on temporal characteristics of application ports lead us to explore principal component analysis (PCA) to uncover temporal correlations among these ports. The experiment results show that there indeed exist several application port clusters in home networks with each cluster exhibiting distinct traffic patterns. For example, one cluster consists of major canonical applications including 80/TCP (HTTP), 443/TCP (HTTPS), 53/UDP (DNS), while another cluster contains a group of unknown ports with all traffic sent to temporary servers running on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). Closer examinations reveal that all the traffic in the latter cluster are associated with suspicious activities.
The analysis on home network traffic also provides a new perspective of understanding unwanted traffic on the Internet. Using traffic data from real home networks, we find incessant unproductive traffic toward home networks. Subsequently, we examine the intensity, sources, and port diversity of these traffic and discuss practical approaches of reducing unwanted traffic toward home networks.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We develop a traffic monitoring platform that automatically collects, analyzes, and makes sense of network traffic for Internet-capable devices in home networks.
• We present traffic characteristics of home networks and apply principal component analysis to uncover temporal correlations among application ports.
• We characterize the intensity, sources, and port diversity of unwanted traffic toward home networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the traffic monitoring platform we developed for home networks, while Sect. 3 presents the basic characteristics of home network traffic and applies principal component analysis to uncover temporal correlations of application ports in home network traffic. In Sect. 4, we characterize unwanted traffic toward home networks. Section 5 discusses related work, and Sect. 6 concludes this paper and outlines the future work.
Traffic monitoring platform for home networks
Managing and securing the increasingly complicated home networks has remained a significant challenge for many home users who often have little technical expertise in network management [10, 11] . Many open-source tools or commercial products are available today to detect Internet malwares such as virus and worms or to filter known attacks through firewalls and intrusion detection systems for home networks. Unfortunately, there exist few simple and intuitive tools that could offer insights on traffic behaviors of home network devices.
To understand what is happening in home networks, we develop a real-time behavior monitoring platform to collect and analyze network traffic for Internet-capable devices in the home. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the monitoring platform captures network traffic via programmable home routers, which connect home networks with the Internet through home gateways such as cable or DSL modems. Using a Linux distribution for embedded devices, OpenWrt [12] , we configure a programmable home router and export network flows traversing through all the interfaces of the router to a traffic profiling server running in the same home network. The continuous network flows, aggregated from IP packets, contain a number of important features for our traffic analysis including the start and end time-stamps, source IP address (srcIP), destination IP address (dstIP), source port number (srcPort), destination port number (dstPort), and protocol, packets, and bytes. Many host-based monitoring systems are also able to collect these traffic flows on individual devices, e.g., Windows and Linux machines; however, such host-based approaches are very difficult to deploy across all the possible devices due to the high heterogeneity of Internet-capable devices in the home.
Compared with incoming and outgoing traffic of home networks, the overhead of transferring flow data from programmable home routers to traffic profiling servers is not significant. Figure 2 shows the overhead of collecting traffic data from programmable home routers (top figure) , the bandwidth usages of outgoing traffic (middle figure), and incoming traffic (bottom figure) of one home network that deploys the platform. As shown in the top figure, the Fig. 1 Traffic monitoring platform for home networks network flow data exported by home routers consume less than 4Kbps bandwidth, which is much smaller than outgoing and incoming traffic illustrated in the middle and bottom graphs. In general, the network bandwidth usage of incoming traffic toward home networks is larger than that of outgoing traffic, as most of Internet activities in these home networks are Web browsing, email communications, and video streaming.
The availability of the traffic monitoring platform makes it possible for us to analyze data traffic exchanged between home devices and Internet end hosts, as well as data traffic exchanged among home network devices. Making sense of these traffic could not only assist home users in understanding what is happening in home networks, but also help detect anomalous traffic toward home networks or originating from compromised home devices. In the next section, we will use traffic data collected from real home networks that deploy the traffic monitoring platform to characterize network traffic of Internet-capable home devices from a variety of traffic information including volume features measured by the numbers of flows, packets, and bytes, social features through analyzing IP addresses and application ports, and temporal dynamics of these traffic. Each of these traffic features captures the behavior of home devices from a unique perspective. Combined together, they provide a broad picture of home network traffic, and more importantly, reveal interesting traffic activities in home networks.
Characterizing home network traffic
In this section, we first describe data sets used in this study and present the general characteristics of home network traffic. Subsequently, we explore principal component analysis to analyze temporal correlations among application ports for uncovering clusters of application ports sharing significant temporal patterns in network traffic.
Data sets
The traffic data used in this study are collected from five home networks (A, B, C, D, E) that deploy our traffic monitoring platform during one-month time span from 09/12/2011 to 10/12/2011. The numbers of total devices in home networks A and B are 6 and 3, respectively. Figure 3 shows the number of online devices in home network A over time. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , the number of online devices in home network A observed during 5-min time bins varies from 0 to 6, reflecting Internet usage patterns of these devices during this one-month time period. Note that the number of home devices remaining above 1 between 09/12 and 09/28 is due to a probing program continuously running on one home device to measure end-to-end performance to a number of distributed servers. These devices collectively have communicated with over 4,800 unique end hosts on the Internet from 529 different autonomous systems (ASes) during this period. Similarly, the devices in home network B collectively communicate with over 4,400 end hosts from 726 ASes.
Traffic characteristics
We study the traffic characteristics of home networks by firstly examining IP addresses and application ports over time, since they reflect whom do home devices communicate with and what applications do home devices use. Figure 4a -c illustrates the numbers of unique destination IP addresses, unique source ports, and unique destination ports for the outgoing traffic during 5-min time bins over time, respectively. Our first interesting observation lies in the large number of unique destination IP addresses during 5-min time bins, as shown in Fig. 4a . Closer examination revealed that a single visit to a major content-rich Web portal could trigger tens of TCP connections to different Web servers, and the large number of destination IP addresses actually correspond to legitimate Web servers visited by home users. For example, our empirical experiment of visiting the front page of http://www.cnn.com with a Firefox browser finds that loading the entire page requires the browser to talk with 18 different IP addresses from a variety of Internet service and content providers including Facebook (social network site), Google (search engine), Limelight Networks (content deliver network), Rackspace Hosting (cloud service provider), Valueclick (online advertising), and cnn itself.
The second observation from Fig. 4 is that the number of unique destination ports for outgoing traffic in home networks is far less than that of unique source ports. The small number of destination ports in outgoing traffic provides a simple and natural classification on home network traffic; thus, we follow a port-driven approach for further traffic analysis. Specifically, we separate outgoing traffic flows into distinct groups based on their destination ports in order to gain an in-depth understanding on network traffic of each individual destination port. Similarly, we group incoming traffic flows into distinct groups based on their source destination ports. Figure 5a , b illustrates the temporal frequency of all destination ports for five home networks during one-month time period, respectively. It is interesting to find three types of temporal patterns among these ports. The first type of destination ports are consistently observed during all days. For example, port 80/TCP is observed in all days during the one-month period in both networks. The second type of ports are observed during several days, while the last type includes ports that are only observed in one or two days suggesting these infrequent ports might be associated with unusual or anomalous traffic. Similar observations hold for the source ports in the incoming traffic toward home networks. More interestingly, Fig. 5a , b also reveal temporal correlations among groups of applications ports that consistently show up around approximately the same times. This observation motivates us to explore correlation analysis techniques to understand the reasons behind such temporal correlations.
Temporal correlation analysis of application ports
To explore temporal correlation among application ports in home networks, we propose to use principal component analysis (PCA) to analyze traffic patterns of network applications. PCA is a widely used technique in network traffic analysis [13] [14] [15] [16] due to its ability of analyzing multivariate data and locating interrelated variables [17] .
Let p and t denote the total number of ports observed in the data and the total number of time bins. Our initial step is to construct a p 9 t matrix X, where x i,j denotes the total number of network flows for the destination port i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . .; pÞ in the outgoing traffic (or the source port i in the incoming traffic) during the j-th ðj ¼ 1; 2; . . .; tÞ time period. The vector x i T reflects a time-series of observations for the application port i. Next we obtain the covariance matrix S, p non-decreasing ordered eigenvalues, k 1 ; k 2 ; . . .; k p , and the corresponding eigenvectors a 1 ; a 2 ; . . .; a p , where s ab is the covariance of two application ports a and b, and Sa i = k i a i , for 1 B i B p.
The p principal components of the matrix X can be derived by projecting the matrix onto the p eigenvectors, i.e., PC i ¼ a Fig. 3 The number of online devices in the home network A over time PCA transforms the space of the p observed variables in the original matrix X into a new space of p principal components fPC i g; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; p. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the eigenvalues using the matrix constructed with the one-month traffic data from home network A. As shown in Fig. 6 , a few largest eigenvalues account for the majority of the variance in the original matrix, suggesting that the corresponding top principal components capture most variances.
Thus, the final step of the PCA process is to project the original data set onto a subspace with a smaller dimensionality to get approximate representations while retaining the majority of the variance in the original data set.
Specifically, we require that the largest m eigenvalues that are larger than a fixed threshold such that each selected principal component captures a non-trivial variance in the original data sets. In the experiment, we use 5% of the total variances as the threshold for determining the value of m.
The principal component PC i can also be represented as: toward the same principal components because of the inherent temporal correlations among these ports. As a result, we group the application ports that contribute similar high influence toward the variance of each of the top principal components into a distinct srcPort cluster for incoming traffic (or a dstPort cluster for outgoing traffic). In other words, PCA discovers the clusters of application ports that exhibit significant correlations in the temporal traffic patterns. Table 1 lists the membership of the 6 dstPort clusters discovered via the principal component analysis using one-month traffic data collected in home network A. Cluster 1 includes port 43/TCP and consecutive ports 33435-33440/UDP. The in-depth analysis shows that the flows associated with 43/TCP are legitimate whois traffic toward Team Cymru IP to AS mapping service, while all traffic associated with ports 33435-33440/UDP were sent toward an unknown server and failed to get response from the server. The legitimate traffic on port 43/TCP and suspicious traffic on 33435-33440/UDP were observed during the same time window, which explain these seven ports to be grouped as a single dstPort cluster. Although Cluster 1 includes a service port 43/TCP, the majority of ports, 33435-33440/UDP, does reflect anomalous traffic activity from one home network device. Cluster 2 includes four canonical ports (i.e., DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, and NTP), which are used by home network devices on a daily basis and thus naturally form a dstPort cluster.
Cluster 3 includes three consecutive ports 16384-16386/ UDP, which was sent by the FaceTime video calling application on an iPhone device. This cluster indicates that many user-installed applications or vendor-installed applications could use non-traditional ports for data communications with end hosts on the Internet. Such practices make it more challenging to differentiate anomalous or legitimate traffic on unusual ports. Cluster 4 includes three ports, i.e., 843/TCP, 1200-1201/TCP. Closer examinations reveal that a Windows laptop communicated with seven different instances in Amazon EC2 Cloud on these three ports simultaneously during 9 different days over the first two weeks. As home users are not aware of any application involving these ports and servers, these traffic is likely sent by a malware on the compromised laptop. Cluster 5 includes two ports 1863/TCP and 7001/UDP used by Windows MSN messenger, while Cluster 6 includes two ports 993/TCP and 5223/TCP, which are used by GMail and Apple Push Notification service running on the iPhone device that connects to the home network over Wi-Fi.
These experiment results with real home network traffic confirm that there indeed exist a variety of dstPort clusters that group applications ports with strong temporal correlations. Some of these clusters, e.g., Cluster 1 and Cluster 4 in Table 1 , even lead to surprising findings on suspicious network traffic originating from home network devices that might be compromised by Internet malwares. Therefore, characterizing network traffic for Internetcapable devices in the home could not only provide valuable insight on behavior patterns of these connected devices, but also help improve the security and management of home networks.
Unwanted traffic toward home networks
Unwanted or unproductive traffic is commonly observed on the Internet [18, 19] . Incoming network traffic collected from programmable home routers provides us an opportunity to characterize the intensity, sources, and port diversity of unwanted traffic toward home networks. In this study, we consider an incoming traffic flow originating from the Internet as unwanted if none of Internet-capable devices in home devices responds to the flow. Figure 7 illustrates the incessant activities of unwanted traffic toward home network A measured by the number of unwanted flows over time. Due to Internet background radiations [18, 19] formed by flooding backscatters, port scanning, and Internet worms, we consistently observe unwanted traffic from the Internet toward home networks. To gain a better understanding on where these traffic originates from, we analyze their source IP addresses and the corresponding ASes. Figure 8a shows the distribution of the source IP addresses of these unwanted traffic and their corresponding ASes in a log-log scale. As shown in Fig. 8a , there exist a few aggressive source IP addresses that send a fairly large number of unwanted traffic flows toward the same home network, while the majority of source IP addresses send only a few flows. The distribution for the source ASes exhibits similar heavy tail patterns.
In addition to studying the sources of these unwanted traffic, we also characterize the diversity of source and destination ports in these traffic. Figure 8b shows the distribution of destination ports observed in unwanted traffic flows and reveals that a small number of destination ports are observed with hundreds, or even thousands, of unwanted traffic flows. Most of these ports are associated with well-known vulnerability, such as port 1080/TCP (Mydoom), port 8000/TCP (a bot malware W32.Spybot.OGX), and port 9000/TCP (a mass-mailing worm W32.Mytob.GK@mm). The dominant nature on destination ports suggests that simple ACL (access control list) rules deployed at access routers of Internet service providers could become very effective for reducing a significant portion of unwanted traffic toward home networks. For traffic flows with unpopular destination ports, e.g., the number of flows less than 5, we aggregate these remaining flows on source ports for exploring the possible concentrations on source ports. As shown in Fig. 8c , many of these remaining flows actually are associated with a few popular source ports caused by flooding backscatters, including port 20/TCP (SSH), port 80/TCP (HTTP), port 443/TCP (HTTPS), port 3389/TCP (trojan Backdoor.Win32.Agent.cdm), port 6667/TCP (IRC), and port 12200/TCP (a recent malware targeting home routers).
The discovery of incoming unwanted traffic toward home networks reflects the challenges of stopping continuous Internet background radiations due to backscatters, port scanning, Internet malwares, and other anomalous activities. The firewalls deployed in home routers are typically very efficient in filtering the majority of such unwanted traffic. However, these malicious traffic toward home routers could become successful if the routers were not properly configured or secured. In other words, protecting home routers and connected devices in the home becomes increasingly critical, as the compromised home devices and routers controlled by attackers would in turn become stepping stones to attack other vulnerable devices on the Internet. Uncovering root causes of how the home network devices exactly get compromised requires packetlevel data, which is not collected by our traffic monitoring platform due to storage overhead on the storage-constraint home routers. However, our traffic monitoring platform has demonstrated the capability of detecting traffic patterns of malicious traffic that compromises the vulnerable devices in home networks. Extracting effective firewall rules from these traffic patterns and deploying these rules on home routers could filter such traffic, thus preventing home network devices from future attacks.
In summary, our experiment results confirm the wide spread of Internet malwares toward connected devices in home networks, and our analysis on unwanted traffic in home networks provides valuable input for botnets detection and spam filtering. As many Internet-capable devices in the home are likely compromised due to wide spread Internet malwares, it is very important to develop effective and user-friendly tools to assist home users in properly configuring firewalls on home routers and end hosts to filter unwanted traffic from the Internet. Moreover, the prevalence of unwanted traffic in home networks calls for realtime traffic monitoring systems from inside home networks to enhance the overall Internet security.
Related work
Unlike enterprise networks which have dedicated network professionals to manage and operate the networks, securing home networks has been a considerable challenge, as most home users do not have sufficient technical expertise and knowledge to manage and secure the networks [21] . As a result, connected devices in home networks are targets and victims of virus, worms, and botnets and become a major source of spams and a part of botnets. In [10] , Feamster proposes to outsource the management and operations of home networks to a third party that has expertise of network operations and security management. In Yang et al. [22] study network management tools that are currently deployed in home networks via interviewing 25 home networks users, and report user experiences of these network management tools. To aid in troubleshooting and managing home networks, [23] proposes to build a home network data recorder system as a general-purpose logging platform to record what is happening in home networks. Many researches have also focused human computer interactions in home networks [2] [3] [4] , troubleshooting and diagnosis [5, 6] , and broadband network sharing among different Internet service providers [24] . Home network performance has recently drawn significant attentions from the research community. A recent work [25] performs controlled experiments in a laboratory environment for evaluating the impact of home networks on end-to-end performance of end systems. In addition, several commercial or open-source tools have been developed for measuring and diagnosing Internet properties of end users. For example, Netalyzr [26] , a network measurement and diagnosis service, tests a wide variety of functionalities at network, transport, and application layers for end users' Internet connectivity in edge networks such as home networks. Kermit, a network probing tool, was developed in [27] to visualize the broadband speed and bandwidth usage for home users. Hatonen et al. [28] measures and analyzes the behavior characteristics of a variety of home gateways such as DSL and cable modems, including NAT binding timeout, throughput, and protocol support, and their influence on network performance and user experience. A recent work [29] measures network access link performance directly from home gateway devices and has inspired us to characterize network traffic from inside home networks through programmable home routers.
As residential broadband users continue to grow, many studies have been devoted to measure and characterize residential broadband networks [7] [8] [9] . However, all of these studies stand from outside home networks and lack the visibility of the home networks, such as home network architecture, diversity of end hosts. For example, [7] examines the growth of residential user-to-user traffic in Japan, a country with a high penetration rate of residential broadband access, and studies the impact of these traffic on usage patterns and traffic engineering of commercial backbone networks. In addition, [8] studies several properties of broadband networks, including link capacities, round-trip times, jitter, and packet loss rates using active TCP and ICMP probes, while [9] passively collects packetlevel traffic data of residential networks at aggregated routers of a large Internet service provider and analyzes dominant characteristics of residential traffic including network and transport-level features, prominent applications, and network path dynamics. Different from these prior work, this paper leverages the availability of traffic flows exported from programmable home routers and presents the first study of traffic characteristics of Internetcapable devices in home networks.
Conclusions and future work
In light of the rapid growth of home networks, this paper develops a traffic monitoring platform to collect and analyze network traffic for Internet-capable devices in home networks. Relying on programmable home routers that connect home networks to the Internet, we first collect network flow streams to traffic profiling servers. Subsequently, we analyze traffic characteristics of home networks and use principal component analysis to uncover distinct clusters of application ports with temporal correlation. Given the prevalence of unwanted traffic on the Internet, we also characterize the intensity, sources, and port diversity of unwanted traffic toward home networks. We are currently developing privacy-preserving data collection capacity into the traffic monitoring platform, so that we could deploy the platform into a large number of home networks to demonstrate its benefits in managing and securing home networks.
